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Abstract
In continuation to earlier works where the problem of joint information embedding
and lossless compression (of the composite signal) was studied in the absence [8] and
in the presence [9] of attacks, here we consider the additional ingredient of protecting
the secrecy of the watermark against an unauthorized party, which has no access to a
secret key shared by the legitimate parties. In other words, we study the problem of
joint coding for three objectives: information embedding, compression, and encryption.
Our main result is a coding theorem that provides a single–letter characterization of the
best achievable tradeoffs among the following parameters: the distortion between the
composite signal and the covertext, the distortion in reconstructing the watermark by
the legitimate receiver, the compressibility of the composite signal (with and without
the key), and the equivocation of the watermark, as well as its reconstructed version,
given the composite signal. In the attack–free case, if the key is independent of the
covertext, this coding theorem gives rise to a threefold separation principle that tells
that asymptotically, for long block codes, no optimality is lost by first applying a rate–
distortion code to the watermark source, then encrypting the compressed codeword,
and finally, embedding it into the covertext using the embedding scheme of [8]. In the
more general case, however, this separation principle is no longer valid, as the key plays
an additional role of side information used by the embedding unit.
Index Terms: Information hiding, watermarking, encryption, data compression, sep-
aration principle, side information, equivocation, rate–distortion.
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1 Introduction
It is common to say that encryption and watermarking (or information hiding) are related
but they are substantially different in the sense that in the former, the goal is to protect
the secrecy of the contents of information, whereas in the latter, it is the very existence of
this information that is to be kept secret.
In the last few years, however, we are witnessing increasing efforts around the combina-
tion of encryption and watermarking, which is motivated by the desire to further enhance
the security of sensitive information that is being hidden in the host signal. This is to
guarantee that even if the watermark is somehow detected by a hostile party, its contents
still remain secure due to the encryption. This combination of watermarking and encryp-
tion can be seen both in recently reported research work (see, e.g., [1],[2],[6],[7],[12],[14] and
references therein) and in actual technologies used in commercial products with a copyright
protection framework, such as the CD and the DVD. Also, some commercial companies
that provide Internet documents, have in their websites links to copyright warning mes-
sages, saying that their data are protected by digitally encrypted watermarks (see, e.g.,
http://genealogy.lv/1864Lancaster/copyright.htm).
This paper is devoted to the information–theoretic aspects of joint watermarking and
encryption together with lossless compression of the composite signal that contains the
encrypted watermark. Specifically, we extend the framework studied in [8] and [9] of joint
watermarking and compression, so as to include encryption using a secret key. Before we
describe the setting of this paper concretely, we pause then to give some more detailed
background on the work reported in [8] and [9].
In [8], the following problem was studied: Given a covertext source vector Xn =
(X1, . . . ,Xn), generated by a discrete memoryless source (DMS), and a message m, uni-
formly distributed in {1, 2, . . . , 2nRe}, independently of Xn, with Re designating the embed-
ding rate, we wish to generate a composite (stegotext) vector Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn) that satisfies
the following requirements: (i) Similarity to the covertext (for reasons of maintaining qual-
ity), in the sense that a distortion constraint, Ed(Xn, Y n) =
∑n
t=1Ed(Xt, Yt) ≤ nD, holds,
(ii) compressibility (for reasons of saving storage space and bandwidth), in the sense that
the normalized entropy, H(Y n)/n, does not exceed some threshold Rc, and (iii) reliability
in decoding the message m from Y n, in the sense that the decoding error probability is ar-
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bitrarily small for large n. A single–letter characterization of the best achievable tradeoffs
among Rc, Re, and D was given in [8], and was shown to be achievable by an extension
of the ordinary lossy source coding theorem, giving rise to the existence of 2nRe disjoint
rate–distortion codebooks (one per each possible watermark message) as long as Re does
not exceed a certain fundamental limit. In [9], this setup was extended to include a given
memoryless attack channel, P (Zn|Y n), where item (iii) above was redefined such that the
decoding was based on Zn rather than on Y n, and where, in view of requirement (ii), it is
understood that the attacker has access to the compressed version of Y n, and so, the at-
tacker decompresses Y n before the attack and re–compresses it after. This extension from
[8] to [9] involved an different approach, which was in the spirit of the Gel’fand–Pinsker
coding theorem for a channel with non–causal side information (SI) at the transmitter [5].
The role of SI, in this case, was played by the covertext.
In this paper, we extend the settings of [8] and [9] to include encryption. For the sake
of clarity of the exposition, we do that in several steps.
In the first step, we extend the attack–free setting of [8]: In addition to including
encryption, we also extend the model of the watermark message source to be an arbitrary
DMS, U1, U2, . . ., independent of the covertext, and not necessarily a binary symmetric
source (BSS) as in [8] and [9]. Specifically, we now assume that the encoder has three inputs
(see Fig. 1): The covertext source vector, Xn, an independent (watermark) message source
vector UN = (U1, . . . , UN ), where N may differ from n if the two sources operate in different
rates, and a secret key (shared also with the legitimate decoder) Kn = (K1, . . . ,Kn), which,
for mathematical convenience, is assumed to operate at the same rate as the covertext. It
is assumed, at this stage, that Kn is independent of UN and Xn. Now, in addition to
requirements (i)-(iii), we impose a requirement on the equivocation of the message source
relative to an eavesdropper that has access to Y n, but not to Kn. Specifically, we would
like the normalized conditional entropy, H(UN |Y n)/N , to exceed a prescribed threshold, h
(e.g., h = H(U) for perfect secrecy). Our first result is a coding theorem that gives a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions, in terms of single–letter inequalities, such that a triple
(D,Rc, h) is achievable, while maintaining reliable reconstruction of U
N at the legitimate
receiver.
In the second step, we relax the requirement of perfect (or almost perfect) watermark
reconstruction, and assume that we are willing to tolerate a certain distortion between
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the watermark message UN and its reconstructed version UˆN , that is, Ed′(UN , UˆN ) =∑N
i=1Ed
′(Ui, Uˆi) ≤ ND
′. For example, if d′ is the Hamming distortion measure then D′,
of course, designates the maximum allowable bit error probability (as opposed to the block
error probability requirement of [8] and [9]). Also, in this case, it makes sense to im-
pose a requirement regarding the equivocation of the reconstructed message, UˆN , namely,
H(UˆN |Y n)/N ≥ h′, for some prescribed constant h′. The rationale is that it is UˆN , not
UN , that is actually conveyed to the legitimate receiver, and hence there is an incentive
to protect the secrecy of UˆN . We will take into account both equivocation requirements,
with the understanding that if one of them is superfluous, then the corresponding thresh-
old (h or h′ accordingly) can always be set to zero. Our second result then extends the
above–mentioned coding theorem to a single–letter characterization of achievable quintuples
(D,D′, Rc, h, h
′). As will be seen, this coding theorem gives rise to a threefold separation
theorem, that separates, without asymptotic loss of optimality, between three stages: rate–
distortion coding of UN , encryption of the compressed bitstream, and finally, embedding the
resulting encrypted version using the embedding scheme of [8]. The necessary and sufficient
conditions related to the encryption are completely decoupled from those of the embedding
and the stegotext compression.
In the third and last step, we drop the assumption of an attack–free system and we
assume a given memoryless attack channel, in analogy to [9]. Again, referring to Fig. 1,
it should be understood that the stegotext Y n is stored (or transmitted) in compressed
form, and that the attacker decompresses Y n before the attack and decompresses after (the
compression and decompression units are omitted from the figure). As it will turn out, in
the case of a memoryless attack, there is an interaction between the encryption and the
embedding, even if the key is still assumed independent of the covertext. In particular, it
will be interesting to see that the key, in addition to its original role in encryption, serves
as SI that is available to both encoder and decoder (see Fig. 2). Also, because of the de-
pendence between the key and the composite signal, and the fact that the key is available
to the legitimate decoder as well, it is reasonable to let the compressibility constraint cor-
respond also to the conditional entropy of Y n given Kn, that is, private compression as
opposed to the previously considered public compression, without the key, which enables
decompression but not decryption (when these two operations are carried out by different,
remote units). Accordingly, we will consider both the conditional and the unconditional en-
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tropies of Y n, i.e., H(Y n)/n ≤ Rc and H(Y
n|Kn)/n ≤ R′c. Our final result then is a coding
theorem that provides a single–letter characterization of the region of achievable six–tuples
(D,D′, Rc, R
′
c, h, h
′). Interestingly, this characterization remains essentially unaltered even
if there is dependence between the key and the covertext, which is a reasonable thing to
have once the key and the stegotext interact in the first place.1 In this context, the sys-
tem designer confronts an interesting dilemma regarding the desirable degree of statistical
dependence between the key and the covertext, which affects the dependence between the
key and the stegotext. On the one hand, strong dependence can reduce the entropy of
Y n given Kn (and thereby reduce R′c), and can also help in the embedding process: For
example, the extreme case of Kn = Xn (which corresponds to private watermarking since
the decoder actually has access to the covertext) is particularly interesting because in this
case, for the encryption key, there is no need for any external resources of randomness, in
addition to the randomness of the covertext that is already available. On the other hand,
when there is strong dependence between Kn and Y n, the secrecy of the watermark might
be sacrificed since H(Kn|Y n) decreases as well. An interesting point, in this context, is that
the Slepian–Wolf encoder [13] (see Fig. 2) is used to generate, from Kn, random bits that
are essentially independent of Y n (as Y n is generated only after the encryption). These
aspects will be seen in detail in Section 4, and even more so, in Section 6.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: In Section 2, we set some
notation conventions. Section 3 will be devoted to a formal problem description and to
the presentation of the main result for the attack–free case with distortion–free watermark
reconstruction (first step described above). In Section 4, the setup and the results will
be extended along the lines of the second and the third steps, detailed above, i.e., a given
distortion level in the watermark reconstruction and the incorporation of an attack channel.
Finally, Sections 5 and 6 will be devoted to the proof of the last (and most general) version
of the coding theorem, with Section 5 focusing on the converse part, and Section 6 – on the
direct part.
1In fact, the choice of the conditional distribution P (Kn|Xn) is a degree of freedom that can be optimized
subject to the given randomness resources.
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2 Notation Conventions
We begin by establishing some notation conventions. Throughout this paper, scalar random
variables (RV’s) will be denoted by capital letters, their sample values will be denoted by
the respective lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by the respective
calligraphic letters. A similar convention will apply to random vectors and their sample
values, which will be denoted with same symbols superscripted by the dimension. Thus,
for example, Aℓ (ℓ – positive integer) will denote a random ℓ-vector (A1, ..., Aℓ), and a
ℓ =
(a1, ..., aℓ) is a specific vector value in A
ℓ, the ℓ-th Cartesian power of A. The notations
aji and A
j
i , where i and j are integers and i ≤ j, will designate segments (ai, . . . , aj) and
(Ai, . . . , Aj), respectively, where for i = 1, the subscript will be omitted (as above). For
i > j, aji (or A
j
i ) will be understood as the null string. Sequences without specifying indices
are denoted by {·}.
Sources and channels will be denoted generically by the letter P , or Q, subscripted by
the name of the RV and its conditioning, if applicable, e.g., PU (u) is the probability function
of U at the point U = u, PK|X(k|x) is the conditional probability of K = k given X = x,
and so on. Whenever clear from the context, these subscripts will be omitted. Information
theoretic quantities like entropies and mutual informations will be denoted following the
usual conventions of the information theory literature, e.g., H(UN ), I(Xn;Y n), and so on.
For single–letter information quantities (i.e., when n = 1 or N = 1), subscripts will be
omitted, e.g., H(U1) = H(U1) will be denoted by H(U), similarly, I(X
1;Y 1) = I(X1;Y1)
will be denoted by I(X;Y ), and so on.
3 Problem Definition and Main Result for Step 1
We now turn to the formal description of the model and the problem setting for step 1, as
described in the Introduction. A source PX , henceforth referred to as the covertext source or
the host source, generates a sequence of independent copies, {Xt}
∞
t=−∞, of a finite–alphabet
RV, X ∈ X . At the same time and independently, another source PU , henceforth referred
to as the message source, or the watermark source, generates a sequence of independent
copies, {Ui}
∞
i=−∞, of a finite–alphabet RV, U ∈ U . The relative rate between the message
source and the covertext source is λ message symbols per covertext symbol. This means
that while the covertext source generates a block of n symbols, say, Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn),
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the message source generates a block of N = λn symbols, UN = (U1, . . . , UN ) (assuming,
without essential loss of generality, that λn is a positive integer). In addition to the covertext
source and the message source, yet another source, PK , henceforth referred to as the key
source, generates a sequence of independent copies, {Kt}
∞
t=−∞, of a finite–alphabet RV,
K ∈ K, independently2 of both {Xt} and {Ui}. The key source is assumed to operate at
the same rate as the covertext source, that is, while the covertext source generates the block
Xn of length n, the key source generates a block of n symbols as well, Kn = (K1, . . . ,Kn).
Given n and λ, a block code for joint watermarking, encryption, and compression is
a mapping fn : U
N × X n × Kn → Yn, N = λn, whose output yn = (y1, . . . , yn) =
fn(u
N , xn, kn) ∈ Yn is referred to as the stegotext or the composite signal, and accord-
ingly, the finite alphabet Y is referred to as the stegotext alphabet. Let d : X × Y → IR+
denote a single–letter distortion measure between covertext symbols and stegotext symbols,
and let the distortion between the vectors, xn ∈ X n and yn ∈ Yn, be defined additively
across the corresponding components, as usual.
An (n, λ,D,Rc, h, δ) code is a block code for joint watermarking, encryption, and com-
pression, with parameters n and λ, that satisfies the following requirements:
1. The expected distortion between the covertext and the stegotext satisfies
n∑
t=1
Ed(Xt, Yt) ≤ nD. (1)
2. The entropy of the stegotext satisfies
H(Y n) ≤ nRc. (2)
3. The equivocation of the message source satisfies
H(UN |Y n) ≥ Nh. (3)
4. There exists a decoder gn : Y
n ×Kn → UN such that
Pe
∆
= Pr{gn(Y
n,Kn) 6= UN} ≤ δ. (4)
For a given λ, a triple (D,Rc, h) is said to be achievable if for every ǫ > 0, there is a
sufficiently large n for which (n, λ,D+ ǫ,Rc + ǫ, h− ǫ, ǫ) codes exist. The achievable region
2The assumption of independence between {Kt} and {Xt} is temporary and made now primarily for the
sake of simplicity of the exposition. It will be dropped later on.
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of triples (D,Rc, h) is the set of all achievable triples (D,Rc, h). For simplicity, it is assumed
3
that H(K) ≤ λH(U) as this upper limit on H(K) suffices to achieve perfect secrecy.
Our first coding theorem is the following:
Theorem 1 A triple (D,Rc, h) is achievable if and only if the following conditions are both
satisfied:
(a) h ≤ H(K)/λ.
(b) There exists a channel {PY |X(y|x), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y} such that: (i) H(Y |X) ≥ λH(U),
(ii) Rc ≥ λH(U) + I(X;Y ), and (iii) D ≥ Ed(X,Y ).
As can be seen, the encryption, on the one hand, and the embedding and the com-
pression, on the other hand, do not interact at all in this theorem. There is a complete
decoupling between them: While condition (a) refers solely to the key and the secrecy of
the watermark, condition (b) is only about the embedding–compression part, and it is a
replica of the conditions of the coding theorem in [8], where the role of the embedding rate,
Re (see Introduction above), is played by the product λH(U). This suggests a very simple
separation principle, telling that in order to attain a given achievable triple (D,Rc, h), first
compress the watermark UN to its entropy, then encrypt Nh bits (out of the NH(U)) of
the compressed bit–string (by bit–by–bit XORing with the same number of compressed key
bits), and finally, embed this partially encrypted compressed bit–string into the covertext,
using the coding theorem of [8] (again, see the Introduction above for a brief description of
this).
4 Extensions to Steps 2 and 3
Moving on to Step 2, we now relax requirement no. 4 in the above definition of an (n, λ,D,Rc, h, δ)
code, and allow a certain distortion between UN and its reconstruction UˆN at the legit-
imate decoder. More precisely, let Uˆ denote a finite alphabet, henceforth referred to as
the message reconstruction alphabet. Let d′ : U × Uˆ → IR+ denote a single–letter distor-
tion measure between message symbols and message reconstruction symbols, and let the
distortion between vectors uN ∈ UN and uˆN ∈ UˆN be again, defined additively across the
3At the end of Section 4 (after Theorem 4), we discuss the case where this limitation (or its analogue in
lossy reconstruction of UN ) is dropped.
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corresponding components. Finally, let RU (D
′) denote the rate–distortion function of the
source PU w.r.t. d
′, i.e.,
RU (D
′) = min{I(U ; Uˆ ) : Ed′(U, Uˆ) ≤ D′}. (5)
It will now be assumed that H(K) ≤ λRU (D
′), for the same reasoning as before.
Requirement no. 4 is now replaced by the following requirement: There exists a decoder
gn : Y
n ×Kn → UˆN such that UˆN = (Uˆ1, . . . , UˆN ) = gn(Y
n,Kn) satisfies:
N∑
i=1
Ed′(Ui, Uˆi) ≤ ND
′. (6)
In addition to this modification of requirement no. 4, we add, to requirement no. 3, a
specification regarding the minimum allowed equivocation w.r.t. the reconstructed message:
H(UˆN |Y n) ≥ Nh′, (7)
in order to guarantee that the secrecy of the reconstructed message is also secure enough.
Accordingly, we modify the above definition of a block code as follows: An (n, λ,D,D′, Rc, h, h
′)
code is a block code for joint watermarking, encryption, and compression with parameters
n and λ that satisfies requirements 1–4, with the above modifications of requirements 3 and
4. For a given λ, a quintuple (D,D′, Rc, h, h
′) is said to be achievable if for every ǫ > 0,
there is a sufficiently large n for which (n, λ,D + ǫ,D′ + ǫ,Rc + ǫ, h− ǫ, h
′ − ǫ) codes exist.
Our second theorem extends Theorem 1 to this setting:
Theorem 2 A quintuple (D,D′, Rc, h, h
′) is achievable if and only if the following condi-
tions are all satisfied:
(a) h ≤ H(K)/λ+H(U)−RU (D
′).
(b) h′ ≤ H(K)/λ.
(c) There exists a channel {PY |X(y|x), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y} such that: (i) λRU (D
′) ≤ H(Y |X),
(ii) Rc ≥ λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y ), and (iii) D ≥ Ed(X,Y ).
As can be seen, the passage from Theorem 1 to Theorem 2 includes the following modifi-
cations: In condition (c), H(U) is simply replaced by RU (D
′) as expected. This means that
the lossless compression code of UN , in the achievability of Theorem 1, is now replaced by a
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rate–distortion code for distortion level D′. Conditions (a) and (b) now tell us that the key
rate (in terms of entropy) should be sufficiently large to satisfy both equivocation require-
ments. Note that the condition regarding the equivocation w.r.t. the clean message source
is softer than in Theorem 1 as H(U) − RU (D
′) ≥ 0. This is because the rate–distortion
code for UN already introduces an uncertainty of H(U)−RU (D
′) bits per symbol, and so,
the encryption should only complete it to the desired level of h bits per symbol. This point
is discussed in depth in [15]. Of course, by setting D′ = 0 (and hence also h′ = h), we are
back to Theorem 1.
We also observe that the encryption and the embedding are still decoupled in Theorem
2, and that an achievable quintuple can still be attained by separation: First, apply a rate–
distortion code to UN , as mentioned earlier, then encrypt N ·max{h+RU (D
′)−H(U), h′}
bits of the compressed codeword (to satisfy both equivocation requirements), and finally,
embed the (partially) encrypted codeword into Xn, again, by using the scheme of [8]. Note
that without the encryption and without requirement no. 2 of the compressibility of Y n,
this separation principle is a special case of the one in [10], where a separation theorem
was established for the Wyner–Ziv source (with SI correlated to the source at the decoder)
and the Gel’fand–Pinsker channel (with channel SI at the encoder). Here, there is no SI
correlated to the source and the role of channel SI is fulfilled by the covertext. Thus, the
new observation here is that the separation theorem continues to hold in the presence of
encryption and requirement no. 2.
Finally, we turn to step 3, of including an attack channel (see Fig. 1). Let Z be a finite
alphabet, henceforth referred to as the forgery alphabet, and let {PZ|Y (z|y), y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z}
denote a set of conditional PMF’s from the stegotext alphabet to the forgery alphabet. We
now assume that the stegotext vector is subjected to an attack modelled by the memoryless
channel,
PZn|Y n(z
n|yn) =
n∏
t=1
PZ|Y (zt|yt). (8)
The output Zn of the attack channel will henceforth be referred to as the forgery.
It is now assumed and that the legitimate decoder has access to Zn, rather than Y n (in
addition, of course, to Kn). Thus, in requirement no. 4, the decoder is redefined again, this
time, as a mapping gn : Z
n×Kn → UˆN such that UˆN = gn(Z
n,Kn) satisfies the distortion
constraint (6). As for the equivocation requirements, the conditioning will now be on both
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Y n and Zn, i.e.,
H(UN |Y n, Zn) ≥ Nh and H(UˆN |Y n, Zn) ≥ Nh′, (9)
as if the attacker and the eavesdropper are the same party (or if they cooperate), then s/he
may access both. In fact, for the equivocation of UN , the conditioning on Zn is immaterial
since UN → Y n → Zn is always a Markov chain, but it is not clear that Zn is superfluous
for the equivocation w.r.t. UˆN since Zn is one of the inputs to the decoder whose output
is UˆN . Nonetheless, for the sake of uniformity and convenience (in the proof), we keep the
conditioning on Zn in both equivocation criteria.
Redefining block codes and achievable quintuples (D,D′, RC , h, h
′) according to the
modified requirements in the same spirit, we now have the following coding theorem, which
is substantially different from Theorems 1 and 2:
Theorem 3 A quintuple (D,D′, Rc, h, h
′) is achievable if and only if there exist RV’s V
and Y such that PKXV Y Z(k, x, v, y, z) = PX(x)PK(k)PV Y |KX(v, y|k, x)PZ|Y (z|y), where the
alphabet size of V is bounded by |V| ≤ |K|·|X |·|Y|+1, and such that the following conditions
are all satisfied:
(a) h ≤ H(K|Y )/λ+H(U)−RU (D
′).
(b) h′ ≤ H(K|Y )/λ.
(c) λRU (D
′) ≤ I(V ;Z|K)− I(V ;X|K).
(d) Rc ≥ λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K) + I(K;Y ).
(e) D ≥ Ed(X,Y ).
First, observe that here, unlike in Theorems 1 and 2, it is no longer true that the
encryption and the embedding (along with stegotext compression) are decoupled, yet the
rate–distortion compression of UN is still separate and decoupled from both. In other words,
the separation principle applies here in partial manner only. Note that now, although K
is still assumed independent of X, it may, in general, depend on Y . On the negative side,
this dependence causes a reduction in the equivocation of both the message source and
its reconstruction, and therefore H(K|Y ) replaces H(K) in conditions (a) and (b). On
the positive side, on the other hand, this dependence introduces new degrees of freedom
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in enhancing the tradeoffs between the embedding performance (condition (c)) and the
compressibility (condition (d)).
The achievability of Theorem 3 involves essentially the same stages as before (rate–
distortion coding of UN , followed by encryption, followed in turn by embedding), but this
time, the embedding scheme is a conditional version of the one proposed in [9], where all
codebooks depend on Kn, the SI given at both ends (see Fig. 2). An interesting point
regarding the encryption is that one needs to generate, from Kn, essentially nH(K|Y )
random bits that are independent of Y n (and Zn), in order to protect the secrecy against an
eavesdropper that observes Y n and Zn. Clearly, if Y n was given in advance to the encrypting
unit, then the compressed bitstring of an optimal lossless source code that compresses Kn,
given Y n as SI, would have this property (as if there was any dependence, then this bitstring
could have been further compressed, which is a contradiction). However, such a source code
cannot be implemented since Y n itself is generated from the encrypted message, i.e., after
the encryption. In other words, this would have required a circular mechanism, which may
not be feasible. A simple remedy is then to use a Slepian–Wolf encoder [13], that generates
nH(K|Y ) bits that are essentially independent of Y n (due to the same consideration),
without the need to access the vector Y n to be generated. For more details, the reader is
referred to the proof of the direct part (Section 6).
Observe that in the absence of attack (i.e., Z = Y ), Theorem 2 is obtained as a special
case of Theorem 3 by choosing V = Y and letting both be independent of K, a choice
which is simultaneously the best for conditions (a)–(d) of Theorem 3. To see this, note the
following simple inequalities: In conditions (a) and (b), H(K|Y ) ≤ H(K). In condition (c),
by setting Z = Y , we have
I(V ;Y |K)− I(V ;X|K) ≤ I(V ;X,Y |K)− I(V ;X|K)
= I(V ;Y |X,K)
≤ H(Y |X,K)
≤ H(Y |X). (10)
Finally in condition (d), clearly, I(K;Y ) ≥ 0 and since X is independent of K, then
I(X;Y, V |K) = I(X;Y, V,K) ≥ I(X;Y ). Thus, for Z = Y , the achievable region of
Theorem 3 is a subset of the one given in Theorem 2. However, since all these inequalities
become equalities at the same time by choosing V = Y and letting both be independent of
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K, the two regions are identical in the attack–free case.
Returning now to Theorem 3, as we observed, Kn is now involved not only in the role of
a cipher key, but also as SI available at both encoder and decoder. Two important points
are now in order, in view of this fact.
First, one may argue that, actually, there is no real reason to assume that Kn is nec-
essarily independent of Xn (see also [11]). If the user has control of the mechanism of
generating the key, then s/he might implement, in general, a channel PKn|Xn(k
n|xn) using
the available randomness resources, and taking (partial) advantage of the randomness of
the covertext. Let us assume that this channel is stationary and memoryless, i.e.,
PKn|Xn(k
n|xn) =
n∏
t=1
PK|X(kt|xt) (11)
with the single–letter transition probabilities {PK|X(k|x) x ∈ X , k ∈ K} left as a degree
of freedom for design. While so far, we assumed that K was independent of X, the other
extreme is, of course, K = X (corresponding to private watermarking). Note, however,
that in the attack–free case, in the absence of the compressibility requirement no. 2 (say,
Rc = ∞), no optimality is lost by assuming that K is independent of X, since the only
inequality where we have used the independence assumption, in the previous paragraph,
corresponds to condition (d).
The second point is that in Theorems 1–3, so far, we have defined the compressibility of
the stegotext in terms of H(Y n), which is suitable when the decompression of Y n is public,
i.e., without access to Kn. The legitimate decoder in our model, on the other hand, has
access to the SI Kn, which may depend on Y n. In this context, it then makes sense to
measure the compressibility of the stegotext also in a private regime, i.e., in terms of the
conditional entropy, H(Y n|Kn).
Our last (and most general) version of the coding theorem below takes these two points
in to account. Specifically, let us impose, in requirement no. 2, an additional inequality,
H(Y n|Kn) ≤ nR′c, (12)
where R′c is a prescribed constant, and let us redefine accordingly the block codes and the
achievable region in terms of six–tuples (D,D′, Rc, R
′
c, h, h
′). We now have the following
result:
Theorem 4 A six–tuple (D,D′, Rc, R
′
c, h, h
′) is achievable if and only if there exist RV’s V
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and Y such that PKXV Y Z(k, x, v, y, z) = PXK(x, k)PV Y |KX(v, y|k, x)PZ|Y (z|y), where the
alphabet size of V is bounded by |V| ≤ |K|·|X |·|Y|+1, and such that the following conditions
are all satisfied:
(a) h ≤ H(K|Y )/λ+H(U)−RU (D
′).
(b) h′ ≤ H(K|Y )/λ.
(c) λRU (D
′) ≤ I(V ;Z|K)− I(V ;X|K).
(d) Rc ≥ λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K) + I(K;Y ).
(e) R′c ≥ λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K).
(f) D ≥ Ed(X,Y ).
Note that the additional condition, (e), is similar to condition (d) except for the term
I(K;Y ). Also, in the joint PMF of (K,X, V, Y, Z) we are no longer assuming that K and
X are independent. It should be pointed out that in the presence of the new requirement
regarding H(Y n|Kn), it is more clear now that introducing dependence of (V, Y ) upon
K is reasonable, in general. In the case K = X, that was mentioned earlier, the term
I(V ;X|K), in condition (c), and the term I(X;Y, V |K), in conditions (d) and (e), both
vanish. Thus, both embedding performance and compression performance improve, like in
private watermarking.
Finally, a comment is in order regarding the assumption H(K) ≤ λRU (D
′), which
implies that H(K|Y ) cannot exceed λRU (D
′) either. If this assumption is removed, and
even H(K|Y ) is allowed to exceed λRU (D
′), then Theorem 4 can be somewhat further
extended. While h cannot be further improved if H(K|Y ) is allowed to exceed λRU (D
′)
(as it already reaches the maximum possible value, h = H(U), for H(K|Y ) = λRU (D
′)), it
turns out that there is still room for improvement in h′. Suppose that instead of one rate–
distortion codebook for UN , we have many disjoint codebooks. In fact, it has been shown
in [8] that there are exponentially 2NH(Uˆ |U) disjoint codebooks, each covering the set of
typical source sequences by jointly typical codewords. Now, if H(K|Y ) > λRU (D
′), we can
use the T = nH(K|Y )−NRU (D
′) excess bits of the compressed key (beyond the NRU (D
′)
bits that are used to encrypt the binary of representation of UˆN ), so as to select one of 2T
codebooks (as long as T < NH(Uˆ |U)), and thus reach a total equivocation of nH(K|Y ) as
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long as nH(K|Y ) ≤ NH(Uˆ), or equivalently, H(K|Y ) ≤ λH(Uˆ ). The equivocation level
h′ = H(Uˆ) is now the “saturation value” that cannot be further improved (in analogy to
h = H(U) for the original source). This means that condition (b) of Theorem 4 would now
be replaced by the condition
h′ ≤ min{H(Uˆ ),H(K|Y )/λ}. (13)
But with this condition, it is no longer clear that the best test channel for lossy compression
of UN is the one that achieves RU (D
′), because for the above modified version of condition
(b), it would be best to have H(Uˆ) as large as possible (as long as it is below H(K|Y )/λ),
which is in partial conflict with the minimization of I(U ; Uˆ) that leads to RU (D
′). Therefore,
a restatement of Theorem 4 would require the existence of a channel {P
Uˆ |U (uˆ|u), u ∈ U , uˆ ∈
Uˆ} (in addition to the existing requirement of a channel PV Y |KX), such that the random
variable Uˆ takes now part in the compromise among all criteria of the problem. This means
that in conditions (a),(c),(d), and (e) of Theorem 4, RU (D
′) should be replaced by I(U ; Uˆ),
and there would be an additional condition (g): Ed′(U, Uˆ) ≤ D′. Condition (a), in view of
the earlier discussion above, would now be of the form:
h ≤ min{H(U),H(K|Y )/λ+H(U)− I(U ; Uˆ)} ≡ H(U)− [I(U ; Uˆ )−H(K|Y )/λ]+, (14)
where [z]+
∆
= max{0, z}. Of course, under the assumption H(K) ≤ λRU (D
′), that we have
used thus far,
H(Uˆ) ≥ I(U ; Uˆ ) ≥ RU (D
′) ≥ H(K)/λ ≥ H(K|Y )/λ, (15)
in other words, min{H(Uˆ ),H(K|Y )/λ} is always attained byH(K|Y )/λ, and so, the depen-
dence on H(Uˆ) disappears, which means that the best choice of Uˆ (for all other conditions)
is back to be the one that minimizes I(U ; Uˆ ), which gives us Theorem 4 as is.
It is interesting to point out that this additional extension gives rise to yet another
step in the direction of invalidating the separation principle: While in Theorem 4 only the
encryption and the embedding interacted, yet the rate–distortion coding of UN was still
independent of all other ingredients of the system, here even this is no longer true, as the
choice of the test channel P
Uˆ |U takes into account also compromises that are associated
with the encryption and the embedding.
Note that this discussion applies also to the classical joint source–channel coding, where
there is no embedding at all: In this case, X is a degenerate RV (say, X ≡ 0, if 0 ∈ X ),
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and so, the mutual information terms depending on X in conditions (c), (d) and (e), all
vanish, the best choice of V is V = Y (thus, the r.h.s in condition (c) becomes the capacity
of the channel PZ|Y with K as SI at both ends), and condition (f) may be interpreted as
a (generalized) power constraint (with power function φ(y) = d(0, y)). Nonetheless, the
new versions of conditions (a) and (b) remain the same as in eqs. (13) and (14). This is
to say that the violation of the separation principle occurs even in the classical model of a
communication system, once security becomes an issue and one is interested in the security
of the reconstructed source.
5 Proof of the Converse Part of Theorem 4
Let an (n, λ,D + ǫ,D′ + ǫ,Rc + ǫ,R
′
c + ǫ, h − ǫ, h
′ − ǫ) code be given. First, from the
requirement H(Y n|Kn) ≤ n(R′c + ǫ), we have:
n(R′c + ǫ) ≥ H(Y
n|Kn) (16)
= H(Y n|UN ,Kn) + I(UN ;Y n|Kn)
≥ H(Y n|UN ,Kn) + I(UN ;Zn|Kn)
= H(Y n|UN ,Kn) + I(UN ;Zn,Kn) (17)
where the second inequality comes from the data processing theorem (UN → Y n → Zn is a
Markov chain given Kn) and the last equality comes from the chain rule and the fact that
UN and Kn are independent. Define V˜t = (X
n
t+1, U
N ,Kt−1, Zt−1), J – as a uniform RV
over {1, . . . , n}, X = XJ , K = KJ , Y = YJ , V
′ = V˜J , and V = (V˜J , J) = (V
′, J). Now,
the first term on the right–most side of eq. (17) is further lower bounded in the following
16
manner.
H(Y n|UN ,Kn) ≥ I(Xn;Y n|UN ,Kn)
= I(Xn;Y n, UN ,Kn)− I(Xn;UN ,Kn)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Y
n, UN ,Kn|Xnt+1)− I(X
n;Kn) (18)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Y
n, UN ,Kn,Xnt+1)− nI(X;K) (19)
≥
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Kt, Yt, U
N ,Kt−1, Zt−1,Xnt+1)− nI(X;K) (20)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Kt, Yt, V˜t)− nI(X;K)
= n[I(X;K,Y, V ′|J)− I(X;K)]
= n[I(X;K,Y, V ′, J)− I(X;K)] (21)
= nI(X;Y, V |K) (22)
where (18) is due to the chain rule and fact that (Xn,Kn) is independent of UN (hence
UN → Kn → Xn is trivially a Markov chain), (19) is due to the memorylessness of
{(Xt,Kt)}, (20) is due to the data processing theorem, and (21) follows from the fact
that {Xt} is stationary and so, X = XJ is independent of J . The second term on the
right–most side of eq. (17) is in turn lower bounded following essentially the same ideas as
in the proof of the converse to the rate–distortion coding theorem (see, e.g., [3]):
I(UN ;Zn,Kn) = H(UN )−H(UN |Zn,Kn)
=
N∑
i=1
[H(Ui)−H(Ui|U
i−1, Zn,Kn)]
=
N∑
i=1
I(Ui;U
i−1, Zn,Kn)
≥
N∑
i=1
I(Ui; [gn(Z
n,Kn)]i)
≥
N∑
i=1
RU (Ed
′(Ui, [gn(Z
n,Kn)]i))
≥ NRU
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ed′(Ui, [gn(Z
n,Kn)]i)
)
≥ NRU (D
′ + ǫ), (23)
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where [gn(Z
n,Kn)]i denotes the i-th component projection of gn(Z
n,Kn), i.e., Uˆi as a
function of (Zn,Kn). Combining eqs. (17), (22), and (23), we get
n(R′c + ǫ) ≥ NRU (D
′ + ǫ) + nI(X;Y, V |K). (24)
Dividing by n, we get
R′c + ǫ ≥ λRU (D
′ + ǫ) + I(X;Y, V |K). (25)
Using the arbitrariness of ǫ together with the continuity of RU (·), we get condition (e) of
Theorem 4.
Condition (d) is derived in the very same manner except that the starting point is the
inequality n(Rc+ ǫ) ≥ H(Y
n), and when H(Y n) is further bounded from below, in analogy
to the chain of inequalities (17), there is an additional term, I(Kn;Y n), that is in turn
lower bounded in the following manner:
I(Kn;Y n) ≥
n∑
t=1
I(Kt;Yt)
= nI(K;Y |J)
= n[H(K|J)−H(K|J, Y )]
≥ n[H(K)−H(K|Y )]
= nI(K;Y ), (26)
where the first inequality is because of the memorylessness of {Kt}, and the second inequal-
ity comes from the facts that conditioning reduces entropy (in the second term) and that
K is independent of J (again, due to the stationarity of {Kt}). This gives the additional
term, I(K;Y ), in condition (d).
Condition (c) is obtained as follows:
NRU (D
′ + ǫ) ≤ I(UN ;Kn, Zn)
= I(UN ;Kn, Zn)− I(UN ;Kn,Xn)
≤
n∑
t=1
[I(V˜t;Kt, Zt)− I(V˜t;Kt,Xt)] (27)
= n[I(V ′;K,Z|J) − I(V ′;K,X|J)]
≤ n[I(V ′, J ;K,Z) − I(V ′, J ;K,X)] (28)
= n[I(V ;K,Z) − I(V ;K,X)]
= n[I(V ;Z|K)− I(V ;X|K)], (29)
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where the first inequality is (23), the first equality is due to the independence between UN
and (Kn,Xn), the second inequality is an application of [5, Lemma 4], the third inequality
is due to the fact that I(K,Z;J) ≥ 0 and I(K,X;J) = 0 (due to the stationarity of
{(Kt,Xt)}), and the last equality is obtained by adding and subtracting I(V ;K). Again,
since this is true for every ǫ > 0, it holds also for ǫ = 0, due to continuity.
As for condition (f), we have:
D + ǫ ≥
1
n
n∑
t=1
Ed(Xt, Yt) = Ed(X,Y ), (30)
and we use once again the arbitrariness of ǫ. Regarding condition (b), we have:
nH(K|Y ) ≥ nH(K|Y, J)
=
n∑
t=1
H(Kt|Yt)
≥
n∑
t=1
H(Kt|K
t−1, Y n)
= H(Kn|Y n)
= H(Kn|Y n, Zn)
≥ I(Kn; UˆN |Y n, Zn)
= H(UˆN |Y n, Zn)−H(UˆN |Y n, Zn,Kn)
= H(UˆN |Y n, Zn)
≥ N(h′ − ǫ), (31)
where the last equality is due to the fact that UˆN is, by definition, a function of (Zn,Kn),
and the last inequality is by the hypothesis that the code achieves an equivocation of at
least N(h′ − ǫ). Dividing by N and taking the limit ǫ → 0, leads to h′ ≤ H(K|Y )/λ,
which is condition (b). Finally, to prove condition (a), consider the inequality nH(K|Y ) ≥
H(UˆN |Y n, Zn), that we have just proved, and proceed as follows (see also [15]):
nH(K|Y ) ≥ H(UˆN |Y n, Zn)
≥ H(UˆN |Y n, Zn) +N(h− ǫ)−H(UN |Y n, Zn)
= N(h− ǫ)−H(UN ) + I(UN ;Y n, Zn)−
I(UˆN ;Y n, Zn) + I(UˆN ;UN ) +H(UˆN |UN )
≥ N [h− ǫ−H(U) +RU (D
′ + ǫ)] +
[I(UN ;Y n, Zn)− I(UˆN ;Y n, Zn) +H(UˆN |UN )], (32)
19
where the second inequality follows from the hypothesis that the code satisfiesH(UN |Y n, Zn) ≥
N(h − ǫ), and the third inequality is due to the memorylessness of {Ui}, the hypothesis
that
∑N
i=1Ed
′(Ui, Uˆi) ≤ N(D
′+ ǫ), and the converse to the rate–distortion coding theorem.
Now, to see that the second bracketed term is non–negative, we have the following chain of
inequalities:
I(UN ;Y n, Zn)− I(UˆN ;Y n, Zn) +H(UˆN |UN )
= I(UN ;Y n, Zn)−H(Y n, Zn) +H(Y n, Zn|UˆN ) +H(UˆN |UN )
≥ I(UN ;Y n, Zn)−H(Y n, Zn) +H(Y n, Zn|UN , UˆN ) +H(UˆN |UN )
= I(UN ;Y n, Zn)−H(Y n, Zn) +H(Y n, Zn, UˆN |UN )
≥ I(UN ;Y n, Zn)−H(Y n, Zn) +H(Y n, Zn|UN )
= 0. (33)
Combining this with eq. (32), we have
nH(K|Y ) ≥ N [h− ǫ−H(U) +RU (D
′ + ǫ)]. (34)
Dividing again by N , and letting ǫ vanish, we obtain h ≤ H(K|Y )/λ + H(U) − RU (D
′),
which completes the proof of condition (a).
To complete the proof of the converse part, it remains to show that the alphabet size
of V can be reduced to |K| · |X | · |Y| + 1. To this end, we extend the proof of the parallel
argument in [9] by using the support lemma (cf. [4]), which is based on Carathe´odory’s
theorem. According to this lemma, given J real valued continuous functionals fj, j = 1, ..., J
on the set P(X ) of probability distributions over the alphabets X , and given any probability
measure µ on the Borel σ-algebra of P(X ), there exist J elements Q1, ..., QJ of P(X ) and
J non-negative reals, α1, ..., αJ , such that
∑J
j=1 αj = 1 and for every j = 1, ..., J
∫
P(X )
fj(Q)µ(dQ) =
J∑
i=1
αifj(Qi). (35)
Before we actually apply the support lemma, we first rewrite the relevant mutual informa-
tions of Theorem 4 in a more convenient form for the use of this lemma. First, observe
that
I(V ;Z|K)− I(V ;X|K) = H(Z|K)−H(Z|V,K)−H(X|K) +H(X|V,K)
= H(Z|K)−H(X|K) +H(K,X|V )−H(K,Z|V ). (36)
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and
I(X;Y, V |K) = I(X;V |K) + I(X;Y |V,K) (37)
= H(X|K) −H(X|V,K) +H(X|V,K) −H(X|V, Y,K)
= H(X|K) −H(X|V, Y,K)
= H(X|K) −H(K,X, Y |V ) +H(K,Y |V ). (38)
For a given joint distribution of (K,X, Y ), and given PZ|Y , H(Z|K) and H(X|K) are both
given and unaffected by V . Therefore, in order to preserve prescribed values of I(V ;Z|K)−
I(V ;X|K) and I(X;V, Y |K), it is sufficient to preserve the associated values H(K,X|V )−
H(K,Z|V ) and H(K,X, Y |V ) − H(K,Y |V ). Let us define then the following functionals
of a generic distribution Q over K × X × Y, where K × X × Y is assumed, without loss of
generality, to be {1, 2, ...,m}, m = |K| · |X | · |Y|:
fi(Q) = Q(k, x, y), i
∆
= (k, x, y) = 1, ...,m − 1 (39)
fm(Q) =
∑
k,x,y
Q(k, x, y)
∑
z
PZ|Y (z|y) log
∑
x,yQ(k, x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)
Q(k, x)
. (40)
Next define
fm+1(Q) =
∑
k,x,y
Q(k, x, y) log
Q(k, y)
Q(k, x, y)
. (41)
Applying now the support lemma, we find that there exists a random variable V (jointly
distributed with (K,X, Y )), whose alphabet size is |V| = m+ 1 = |K| · |X | · |Y| + 1 and it
satisfies simultaneously:
∑
v
Pr{V = v}fi(P (·|v)) = PKXY (k, x, y), i = 1, ...,m − 1, (42)
∑
v
Pr{V = v}fm(P (·|v)) = H(K,X|V )−H(K,Z|V ), (43)
and
∑
u
Pr{V = v}fm+1(P (·|v)) = H(K,X, Y |V )−H(K,Y |V ). (44)
It should be pointed out that this random variable maintains the prescribed distortion
level Ed(X,Y ) since PXY is preserved. By the same token, H(K|Y ) and I(K;Y ), which
depend only on PKY , are preserved as well. This completes the proof of the converse part
of Theorem 4.
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6 Proof of the Direct Part of Theorem 4
In this section, we show that if there exist RV’s (V, Y ) that satisfy the conditions of Theorem
4, then for every ǫ > 0, there is a sufficiently large n for which (n, λ,D+ǫ,D′+ǫ,Rc+ǫ,R
′
c+
ǫ, h − ǫ, h′ − ǫ) codes exist. One part of the proof is strongly based on a straightforward
extension of the proof of the direct part of [9] to the case of additional SI present at both
encoder and decoder. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, the full details are provided
here. It should be pointed out that for the attack–free case, an analogous extension can
easily be offered to the direct part of [8].
We first digress to establish some additional notation conventions associated with the
method of types [4]. For a given generic finite–alphabet random variable (RV) A ∈ A (or
a vector of RV’s taking on values in A), and a vector aℓ ∈ Aℓ (ℓ – positive integer), the
empirical probability mass function (EPMF) is a vector Paℓ = {Paℓ(a
′), a′ ∈ A}, where
Paℓ(a
′) is the relative frequency of the letter a′ ∈ A in the vector aℓ. Given δ > 0, let
us denote the set of all δ-typical sequences of length ℓ by T δPA , or by T
δ
A (if there is no
ambiguity regarding the PMF that governs A), i.e., T δA is the set of the sequences a
ℓ ∈ Aℓ
such that
(1− δ)PA(a
′) ≤ Paℓ(a
′) ≤ (1 + δ)PA(a
′) (45)
for every a′ ∈ A. For sufficiently large ℓ, the size of T δA is well–known [4] to be bounded by
2ℓ[(1−δ)H(A)−δ] ≤ |T δA| ≤ 2
ℓ(1+δ)H(A). (46)
It is also well–known (by the weak law of large numbers) that:
Pr
{
Aℓ /∈ T δA
}
≤ δ (47)
for all ℓ sufficiently large. For a given generic channel PB|A(b|a) and for each a
ℓ ∈ T δA, the
set of all sequences bl that are jointly δ-typical with aℓ, will be denoted by T δPB|A(a
ℓ), or by
T δ
B|A(a
ℓ) if there is no ambiguity, i.e., T δ
B|A(a
ℓ) is the set of all bℓ such that:
(1− δ)Paℓ (a
′)PB|A(b
′|a′) ≤ Paℓbℓ(a
′, b′) ≤ (1 + δ)Paℓ(a
′)PB|A(b
′|a′), (48)
for all a′ ∈ A, b′ ∈ B, where Paℓbℓ(a
′, b′) denotes the fraction of occurrences of the pair
(a′, b′) in (aℓ, bℓ). Similarly as in eq. (45), for all sufficiently large ℓ and aℓ ∈ T δA, the size of
T δ
B|A(a
ℓ) is bounded as follows:
2ℓ[(1−δ)H(B|A)−δ] ≤ |T δB|A(a
ℓ)| ≤ 2ℓ(1+δ)H(B|A). (49)
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Finally, observe that for all aℓ ∈ T δA and b
ℓ ∈ T δ
B|A(a
ℓ), the distortion d(aℓ, bℓ) =
∑ℓ
j=1 d(aj , bj)
is upper bounded by:
d(aℓ, bℓ) ≤ ℓ(1 + δ)2
∑
a′,b′
PA(a
′)PB|A(b
′|a′)d(a′, b′)
∆
= ℓ(1 + δ)2Ed(A,B). (50)
Let (K,X, V, Y, Z) be a given random vector that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.
We now describe the mechanisms of random code selection and the encoding and decoding
operations. For a given ǫ > 0, fix δ such that 2δ+max{2 ·exp{−2nδ}+2−nδ, δ2} ≤ ǫ. Define
also
ǫ1
∆
= δ[1 +H(V |K) +H(V |K,X)], (51)
ǫ2
∆
= δ[1 +H(Y |K,V ) +H(Y |K,X, V )], (52)
and
ǫ3
∆
= δ[1 +H(V |K) +H(V |Z,K)]. (53)
Generation of a rate–distortion code:
Apply the type–covering lemma [4] and construct a rate–distortion codebook that covers
T δU within distortion N(D
′ + ǫ) w.r.t. d′, using 2NRU (D
′) codewords.
Generation of the encrypting bitstream:
For every kn ∈ T δK , randomly select an index in the set {0, 1, . . . , 2
n[H(K|Y )+δ]−1} with a uni-
form distribution. Denote by sJ(kn) = (s1(k
n), . . . , sJ(k
n)), sj(k
n) ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, . . . , J ,
the binary string of length J = n[H(K|Y )+δ] that represents this index. (Note that sJ(kn)
can be interpreted as the output of the Slepian–Wolf encoder for Kn, where Y n plays the
role of SI at the decoder [13].)
Generation of an auxiliary embedding code:
We first construct an auxiliary code capable of embedding 2NRU (D
′) watermarks by a ran-
dom selection technique. First, M1 = 2
nR1 , R1 = I(V ;Z|K)−ǫ3−δ, sequences {V
n(i, kn)},
i ∈ {1, . . . ,M1}, are drawn independently from T
δ
V |K(k
n) for every kn ∈ T δK . For every such
kn, let us denote the set of these sequences by C(kn). The elements of C(kn) are evenly
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distributed among MU
∆
= 2NRU (D
′) bins, each of size M2 = 2
nR2 , R2 = I(X;V |K) + ǫ1 + δ
(this is possible thanks to condition (c) of Theorem 4, provided that the inequality therein
is strict). A different (encrypted) message of length L = NRU (D
′) = nλRU (D
′) bits is
attached to each bin, identifying a sub-code that represents this message. We denote the
codewords in bin number m (m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,MU}), by {V
n(m, j, kn)}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M2}.
Stegotext sequence generation:
For each auxiliary sequence (in the above auxiliary codebook of each δ–typical kn), V n(m, j, kn) =
vn, a set of M3
∆
= 2nR3 , R3 = I(X;Y |V,K) + ǫ2 + δ, stegotext sequences {Y
n(j′, vn, kn)},
j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M3}, are independently drawn from T
δ
Y |VK(v
n, kn). We denote this set by
C(vn, kn).
Encoding:
Upon receiving a triple (uN , xn, kn), the encoder acts as follows:
1. If uN ∈ T δU , let w
L = (w1, . . . , wL), wi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , L be the binary repre-
sentation of the index of the rate–distortion codeword for the message source. For
kn ∈ T δK , let s
J(kn) = (s1(k
n), . . . , sJ(k
n)) denote binary representation string of the
index of kn. Let w˜L = (w˜1, . . . , w˜L), where w˜j = wj ⊕ sj(k
n), j = 1, . . . , J , and
w˜j = wj , j = J +1, . . . , L, and where ⊕ denotes modulo 2 addition i.e., the XOR op-
eration.4 The binary vector w˜L is the (partially) encrypted message to be embedded.
Let m =
∑L
l=1 w˜l2
l−1 + 1 denote the index of this message. If uN /∈ T δU or k
n /∈ T δK ,
an arbitrary (error) message w˜L is generated (say, the all–zero message).
2. If (kn, xn) ∈ T δKX find, in bin number m, the first j such that V
n(m, j, kn) = vn
is jointly typical, i.e., (kn, xn, vn) ∈ T δKXV , and then find the first j
′ such that
Y n(j′, vn, kn) = yn ∈ C(vn, kn) is jointly typical, i.e., (kn, xn, vn, yn) ∈ T δKXV Y .
This vector yn is chosen for transmission. If (kn, xn) /∈ T δKX , or if there is no
V n(m, j, kn) = vn and Y n(j′, vn, kn) = yn such that (kn, xn, vn, yn) ∈ T δKXV Y , an
arbitrary vector yn ∈ Yn is transmitted.
Decoding:
Upon receiving Zn = zn and Kn = kn, the decoder finds all sequences {vn} in C(kn) such
4Note that since H(K) is assumed smaller than λRU (D
′), then so is H(K|Y ), and therefore J ≤ L.
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that (kn, vn, zn) ∈ T δKV Z . If all {v
n} found belong to the same bin, say, mˆ, then mˆ is decoded
as the embedded message, and then the binary representation vector wˆL = (wˆ1, . . . , wˆL)
corresponding to mˆ is decrypted, again, by modulo 2 addition of its first J bits with sJ(kn).
This decrypted binary L–vector is then mapped to the corresponding reproduction vector
u˜N of the rate–distortion codebook for the message source. If there is no vn ∈ C(kn) such
that (kn, vn, zn) ∈ T δKV Z or if there exist two or more bins that contain such a sequence, an
error is declared.
We now turn to the performance analysis of this code in all relevant aspects. For each
triple (kn, xn, uN ) and particular choices of the codes, the possible causes for incorrect
watermark decoding are the following:
1. (kn, xn, uN ) /∈ T δKX × T
δ
U . Let the probability of this event be defined as Pe1 .
2. (kn, xn, uN ) ∈ T δKX × T
δ
U , but in bin no. m there is no v
n s.t. (kn, xn, vn) ∈ T δKXV .
Let the probability of this event be defined as Pe2 .
3. (kn, xn, uN ) ∈ T δKX × T
δ
U and in bin no. m there is v
n s.t. (kn, xn, vn) ∈ T δKXV , but
there is no yn ∈ C(vn, kn) s.t. (kn, xn, vn, yn) ∈ T δKXV Y . Let the probability of this
event be defined as Pe3 .
4. (kn, xn, uN ) ∈ T δKX × T
δ
U and in bin no. m there is v
n and yn ∈ C(vn, kn) such that
(kn, xn, vn, yn) ∈ T δKXV Y , but (k
n, vn, zn) /∈ T δKV Z . Let the probability of this event
be defined as Pe4 .
5. (kn, xn, uN ) ∈ T δKX × T
δ
U and in bin no. m there is v
n and yn ∈ C(vn, kn) such that
(kn, xn, vn, yn) ∈ T δKXV Y , and (k
n, vn, zn) ∈ T δKV Z , but there exists another bin, say,
no. m˜, that contains v˜n s.t. (kn, v˜n, zn) ∈ T δKV Z . Let the probability of this event be
defined as Pe5 .
If none of these events occur, the message w˜L (or, equivalently, m) is decoded correctly
from zn, the distortion constraint between xn and yn is within n(D + ǫ) (as follows from
(50)), and the distortion between uN and its rate–distortion codeword, u˜N = uˆN , does not
exceed N(D′ + ǫ). Thus, requirements 1 and 4 (modified according to eq. (6), with D′ + ǫ
replacing D′) are both satisfied. Therefore, we first prove that the probability for none of
the events 1–5 to occur, tends to unity as n→∞.
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The average probability of error Pe in decoding m is bounded by
Pe ≤
5∑
i=1
Pei . (54)
The fact that Pe1 → 0 follows immediately from (47). As for Pe2 , we have:
Pe2
∆
=
M2∏
j=1
Pr{(kn, xn, V n(m, j, kn)) /∈ T δKXV }. (55)
Now, by (46), for every j and every (kn, xn) ∈ T δKX :
Pr{V n(m, j, kn) /∈ T δV |KX(k
n, xn)} = 1− Pr{V n(m, j, kn) ∈ T δV |KX(k
n, xn)}
= 1−
|T δ
V |KX(k
n, xn)|
|T δ
V |K(k
n)|
≤ 1−
2n[(1−δ)H(V |K,X)−δ]
2n(1+δ)H(V |K)
= 1− 2−n[I(X;V |K)+ǫ1]. (56)
Substitution of (56) into (55) provides us with the following upper bound:
Pe2 ≤
[
1− 2−n[I(X;V |K)+ǫ1]
]M2
≤ exp
{
− 2nR2 · 2−n[I(X;V |K)+ǫ1]
}
→ 0, (57)
double–exponentially rapidly since R2 = I(X;V |K) + ǫ1 + δ. To estimate Pe3 , we repeat
the same technique:
Pe3
∆
=
M3∏
j′=1
Pr{(kn, xn, vn, Y n(j′, vn, kn)) /∈ T δKXV Y }. (58)
Again, by the property of the typical sequences, for every j′ and (kn, xn, vn) ∈ T δKXV :
Pr{Y n(j′, vn, kn) /∈ T δY |KXV (k
n, xn, vn)} ≤ 1− 2−n[I(X;Y |V,K)+ǫ2], (59)
and therefore, substitution of (59) into (58) gives
Pe3 ≤
[
1− 2−n[I(X;Y |V,K)+ǫ2]
]M3
≤ exp
{
− 2nR3 · 2−n[I(X;Y |V,K)+ǫ2]
}
→ 0, (60)
double–exponentially rapidly sinceR3 = I(X;Y |V,K)+ǫ2+δ. The estimation of Pe4 is again
based on properties of typical sequences. Since Zn is the output of a memoryless channel
PZ|Y with input y
n = Y n(j′, vn, kn) and by the assumption of this step (kn, xn, vn, yn) ∈
T δKXV Y , from (47) and the Markov lemma [3, Lemma 14.8.1], we obtain
Pe4 = Pr{(k
n, xn, vn, yn, Zn) /∈ T δKXV Y Z} ≤ δ, (61)
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and similarly to Pe1 , Pe4 can be made as small as desired by an appropriate choice of δ.
Finally, we estimate Pe5 as follows:
Pe5 = Pr{∃m˜ 6= m : (k
n, V n(m˜, j, kn), zn) ∈ T δKV Z} (62)
≤
∑
m˜6=m, j∈{1,2,...,M2}
Pr{(kn, V n(m˜, j, kn), zn) ∈ T δKV Z}
= (2NRU (D
′) − 1)2nR2 Pr{(kn, V n(m˜, j, kn), zn) ∈ T δKV Z}
≤ 2nR12−n[I(V ;Z|K)−ǫ3]. (63)
Now, since R1 = I(V ;Z|K) − ǫ3 − δ, Pe5 → 0. Since Pei → 0 for i = 1, . . . , 5, their sum
tends to zero as well, implying that there exist at least one choice of an auxiliary code and
related stegotext codes that give rise to the reliable decoding of W˜L.
Now, let us denote by Nc the total number of composite sequences in a codebook that
corresponds to a δ–typical kn. Then,
Nc = MU ·M2 ·M3
= 2n[λRU (D
′)+I(X;V |K)+I(X;Y |V,K)+ǫ1+ǫ2+2δ]
= 2n[λRU (D
′)+I(X;Y,V |K)+ǫ1+ǫ2+2δ]. (64)
Thus,
H(Y n|Kn) ≤ logNc
= n[λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K) + ǫ1 + ǫ2 + 2δ]
≤ n(R′c + ǫ1 + ǫ2 + 2δ), (65)
where in the last inequality we have used condition (e). For sufficiently small values of δ
(and hence of ǫ1 and ǫ2) ǫ1 + ǫ2 + 2δ ≤ ǫ and so, the compressibility requirement in the
presence of Kn is satisfied.
We next prove the achievability of Rc. Let us consider the set of δ–typical key sequences
T δK , and view it as the union of 0–typical sets (i.e., δ–typical sets with δ = 0), {T
0
QK
}, where
QK exhausts the set of all rational PMF’s with denominator n, and with the property
(1− δ)PK(k) ≤ QK(k) ≤ (1 + δ)PK(k), ∀k ∈ K. (66)
Suppose that we have already randomly selected a codebook for one representative member
kˆn of each type class T 0QK ⊂ T
δ
K using the mechanism described above. Now, consider the
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set of all permutations from kˆn to every other member of T 0QK . The auxiliary codebook
and the stegotext codebooks for every other key sequence, kn ∈ T 0QK will be obtained by
permuting all (auxiliary and stegotext) codewords of those corresponding to kˆn according
to the same permutation that leads from kˆn to kn (thus preserving all the necessary joint
typicality properties). Now, in the union of all stegotext codebooks, corresponding to all
typical key sequences, each codeword will appear at least (n + 1)−|K|·|Y| · 2n[(1−δ)H(K|Y )−δ]
times, which is a lower bound to the number of permutations of kˆn which leave a given
stegotext codeword yn unaltered. The total number of stegotext codewords, NY , in all
codebooks of all δ–typical key sequences (including repetitions) is upper bounded by
NY = |T
δ
K | ·Nc
≤ 2n[(1+δ)H(K)+δ] · 2n[λRU (D
′)+I(X;Y,V |K)+ǫ1+ǫ2+2δ]
= 2n[H(K)+λRU (D
′)+I(X;Y,V |K)+ǫ1+ǫ2+δ(H(K)+3)]. (67)
Let C denote the union of all stegotext codebooks, namely, the set of all distinct stegotext
vectors across all codebooks corresponding to all kn ∈ T δK , and let N(y
n) denote the number
of occurrences of a given vector yn ∈ Yn in all stegotext codebooks. Then, in view of the
above combinatorial consideration, we have
NY =
∑
yn∈C
N(yn) ≥ |C| · (n+ 1)−|K|·|Y| · 2n[(1−δ)H(K|Y )−δ]. (68)
Combining eqs. (67) and (68), we have
log |C| ≤ n[λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K) + I(K;Y ) + δ′], (69)
where
δ′ = ǫ1 + ǫ2 + δ(H(K) +H(K|Y ) + 4) + |K| · |Y| ·
log(n+ 1)
n
, (70)
which is arbitrarily small provided that δ is sufficiently small and n is sufficiently large.
Thus, the rate required for public compression of Y n (without the key), which is (log |C|)/n,
is arbitrarily close to [λRU (D1)+ I(X;Y, V |K)+ I(K;Y )], which in turn is upper bounded
by Rc, by condition (d) of Theorem 4.
Before we proceed to evaluate the equivocation levels, an important comment is in
order in the context of public compression (and a similar comment will apply to private
compression): Note that a straightforward (and not necessary optimal) method for public
28
compression of Y n is simply according to its index within T δY , which requires about nH(Y )
bits. On the other hand, the converse theorem tells us that the compressed representation
of Y n cannot be much shorter than n[λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K) + I(K;Y )] bits (cf. the
necessity of condition (d) of Theorem 4). Thus, contradiction between these two facts is
avoided only if
λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K) + I(K;Y ) ≤ H(Y ), (71)
or, equivalently,
λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K) ≤ H(Y |K). (72)
This means that any achievable point (D,D′, Rc, R
′
c, h, h
′) corresponds to a choice of random
variables (K,X, Y, V ) that must inherently satisfy eq. (72). This observation will now help
us also in estimating the equivocation levels.
Consider first the equivocation w.r.t. the reproduction, for which we have the following
chain of inequalities:
Nh′ ≤ nH(K|Y ) (73)
= nH(K)− nI(K;Y )
= H(Kn)− nI(K;Y ) (74)
= H(Kn|Y n, Zn) + I(Kn;Y n, Zn)− nI(K;Y )
= H(Kn|Y n, Zn) + I(Kn;Y n)− nI(K;Y ) (75)
= H(Kn|Y n, Zn) +H(Y n)−H(Y n|Kn)− nI(K;Y )
≤ H(Kn|Y n, Zn) + n[λRU (D
′) + I(X;Y, V |K) + I(K;Y ) + ǫ]−
−n[λRU(D
′ + ǫ) + I(X;Y, V |K)− ǫ]− nI(K;Y ) (76)
= H(Kn|Y n, Zn) + nλ[RU (D
′)−RU (D
′ + ǫ)] + nǫ
∆
= H(Kn|Y n, Zn) + nǫ′
= I(Kn; UˆN |Y n, Zn) +H(Kn|Y n, Zn, UˆN ) + nǫ′
≤ H(UˆN |Y n, Zn) +H(Kn|Y n, Zn, UˆN ) + nǫ′ (77)
where (73) is based on condition (b), (74) is due to the memorylessness of Kn, (75) follows
from the fact that Kn → Y n → Zn is a Markov chain, (76) is due to the sufficiency of
condition (d) (that we have just proved) and the necessity of condition (e), and ǫ′ vanishes
as ǫ→ 0 due to the continuity of RU (·). Comparing the left–most side and the right–most
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side of the above chain of inequalities, we see that to prove that H(UˆN |Y n, Zn) is essentially
at least as large as Nh′, it remains to show that H(Kn|Y n, Zn, UˆN ) is small, say,
H(Kn|Y n, Zn, UˆN ) ≤ nǫ′ (78)
for large n. We next focus then on the proof of eq. (78).
First, consider the following chain of inequalities:
H(Kn|Y n, Zn, UˆN ) ≤ H(Kn, SJ(Kn)|Y n, Zn, UˆN )
= H(SJ(Kn)|Y n, Zn, UˆN ) +H(Kn|SJ(Kn), Y n, Zn, UˆN )
≤ H(SJ(Kn)|Y n, UˆN ,WL) +H(Kn|SJ(Kn), Y n), (79)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that WL is function of UˆN and the fact
that conditioning reduces entropy. As for the second term of the right–most side, we have
by Fano’s inequality
H(Kn|SJ(Kn), Y n) ≤ 1 + Perr · n log |K| ≤ nǫ
′/2 for large enough n, (80)
as Perr → 0 is the probability of error associated with the Slepian–Wolf decoder that
estimates Kn from its compressed version, SJ(Kn), and the “side information,” Y n. As for
the first term of the right–most side of (79), we have
H(SJ(Kn)|Y n, UˆN ,WL) = H(WL ⊕ W˜L|Y n, UˆN ,WL)
≤ H(W˜L|Y n). (81)
It remains to show that H(W˜L|Y n) ≤ nǫ′/2 as well. In order to show this, we have to
demonstrate that for a good code, once Y n is given, there is very little uncertainty with
regard to W˜L, which is the index of the bin.
To this end, let us suppose that the inequality in (72) is strict (otherwise, we can
slightly increase the allowable distortion level D′ and thus reduce RU (D
′)). As we prove in
the Appendix, for any given (arbitrarily small) γ > 0,
Pr{∃ yn in the code of kˆn that appears in more than 2nγ bins} ≤ |Y|n2−(nγ−log e)2
nγ
, (82)
that is, a double–exponential decay. The probability of the union of these events across all
representatives {kˆn} of all T 0QK ⊂ T
δ
K will just be multiplied by the number of {T
0
QK
} in
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T δK , which is polynomial, and hence will continue to decay double–exponentially. Let us
define then the event
{∃ yn in the stego–codebook of some kˆn that appears in more than 2nγ bins}
as yet another error event (like the error events 1–5) that occurs with very small probability.
Assume then, that the randomly selected codebook is “good” in the sense that no stegovector
appears in more than 2nγ bins, for any of the representatives {kˆn}. Now, given yn, how many
candidate bins (corresponding to encrypted messages {w˜L}) can be expected at most? For
a given yn, let us confine attention to the δ–conditional type class T δ
K|Y (y
n) (key sequences
outside this set cannot have yn in their codebooks, as they are not jointly δ–typical with yn).
The conditional δ–type class T δ
K|Y (y
n) can be partitioned into conditional 0–type classes
{T 0QK|Y (y
n)}, where QK|Y exhausts the allowed δ–tolerance in the conditional distribution
around PK|Y , in the same spirit as before. Now, take an arbitrary representative k˜
n from
a given T 0QK|Y (y
n), and consider the set of all permutations that lead from k˜n to all other
members {kn} of T 0QK|Y (y
n). Obviously, the stego–codebooks of all those {kn} have exactly
the same configuration of occurrences of yn as that of k˜n (since these permutations leave
yn unaltered), therefore they belong to exactly the same bins as in the codebook of k˜n, the
number of which is at most 2γn, by the hypothesis that we are using a good code. In other
words, as kn scans T 0QK|Y (y
n), there will be no new bins that contain yn relative to those
that are already in the codebook of k˜n. New bins that contain yn can be seen then only
by scanning the other conditional 0–types {T 0QK|Y (y
n)} within T δ
K|Y (y
n), but the number
such conditional 0–types does not exceed the total number of conditional 0–types, which is
upper bounded, in turn, by (n + 1)|K|·|Y| [4]. Thus, the totality of stego–codebooks, for all
relevant {kn} cannot give more than (n + 1)|K|·|Y| · 2nγ distinct bins altogether. In other
words, for a good codebook:
H(W˜L|Y n) ≤ log[(n + 1)|K|·|Y| · 2nγ ] = n
[
γ + |K| · |Y| ·
log(n+ 1)
n
]
(83)
which is less than nǫ′/2 for an appropriate choice of γ and for large enough n.
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Finally, for the equivocation w.r.t. the original message source, we have the following:
H(UN |Y n, Zn) = H(UˆN |Y n, Zn) +H(UN |Y n, Zn)−H(UˆN |Y n, Zn)
≥ nH(K|Y )− 2nǫ′ +H(UN |Y n, Zn)−H(UˆN |Y n, Zn)
= nH(K|Y ) +H(UN )− I(UN ; UˆN )− I(UN ;Y n, Zn)−
H(UˆN |UN ) + I(UˆN ;Y n, Zn)− 2nǫ′
≥ nH(K|Y ) +H(UN )−H(UˆN )− I(UN ;Y n, Zn)−
H(UˆN |UN ) + I(UˆN ;Y n, Zn)− 2nǫ′
≥ nH(K|Y ) +NH(U)−NRU (D
′)− 2ǫ′]−
[I(UN ;Y n, Zn) +H(UˆN |UN )− I(UˆN ;Y n, Zn)], (84)
where first inequality is due to the fact that H(UˆN |Y n, Zn) ≥ n[H(K|Y ) − 2ǫ′], that we
have just shown, and the third is due to the memorylessness of {Ui} and the fact that the
rate–distortion codebook size is 2NRU (D
′) and so, H(UˆN ) ≤ NRU (D
′). Now, the second
bracketed expression on the right–most side is the same as in eq. (33), where in the case
of this specific scheme, both inequalities in (33) become equalities, i.e., this expression
vanishes. This is because in our scheme, UN → UˆN → (Y n, Zn) is a Markov chain (and so,
the first inequality of (33) is tight) and because H(UˆN |UN , Y n, Zn) ≤ H(UˆN |UN ) = 0 (as
UˆN is a deterministic function of UN ), which makes the second inequality of (33) tight. As
a result, we have
H(UN |Y n, Zn) ≥ N [H(K|Y )/λ+H(U)−RU (D
′)− 2ǫ′/λ]
≥ N [h+RU (D
′)−H(U) +H(U)−RU (D
′)− 2ǫ/λ]
= N(h− 2ǫ′/λ), (85)
where we have used condition (a). This completes the proof of the direct part.
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Appendix
Proof of eq. (82). The probability of obtaining yn in a single random selection within the
codebook of kˆn is given by
Pr{Y n(j′, V n(m, j, kˆn), kˆn) = yn} =
|T δ
V |KY (k
n, yn)|
|T δ
V |K(k
n)|
·
1
|T δ
Y |KV (k
n, vn)|
(A.1)
≤
2n(1+δ)H(V |K,Y )
2n[(1−δ)H(V |K)−δ]
·
1
2n[(1−δ)H(Y |K,V )−δ]
= 2−n[H(Y |K)−δ
′′], (A.2)
where the first factor in the right–hand side of (A.1) is the probability of having a V n(m, j, kˆn) =
vn that is typical with yn and kˆn (a necessary condition for this vn to generate the given
yn), the second factor is the probability of selecting a given yn in the random selection of
the steogtext code, and where
δ′′ = δ[H(V |K,Y ) +H(V |K) +H(Y |K,V ) + 2]. (A.3)
It now follows that the probability q for at least one occurrence of yn among the stegowords
corresponding to a certain bin, in the codebook of kˆn, is upper bounded (using the union
bound) by
q ≤ M2 ·M3 · 2
−n[H(Y |K)−δ′′]
= 2−n[H(Y |K)−I(X;V |K)−I(X;Y |V,K)−δ
′′−2δ−ǫ1−ǫ2]
= 2−n[H(Y |K)−I(X;V,Y |K)−δ
′′−2δ−ǫ1−ǫ2]
∆
= 2−n[H(Y |K)−I(X;Y,V |K)−δ1]. (A.4)
We are interested to upper bound the probability that a given yn appears as a stegoword
in more than 2nγ bins in the codebook of kˆn, for a given γ > 0. For i = 1, . . . ,MU , let
Ai ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator function of the event
{ynappears as a stegoword in bin no. i at least once}.
Then, clearly {Ai} are i.i.d. with Pr{Ai = 1} = q. Therefore,
Pr
{
MU∑
i=1
Ai ≥ 2
nγ
}
≤ exp2
{
−MUD
(
2nγ
MU
‖q
)}
= exp2
{
−MUD
(
2−n[λRU (D
′)−γ]‖q
)}
, (A.5)
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where for α, β ∈ [0, 1], the function D(α‖β) designates the binary divergence
D(α‖β) = α log
α
β
+ (1− α) log
1− α
1− β
. (A.6)
Now, referring to eq. (72), suppose that
H(Y |K) ≥ λRU (D
′) + I(X;V, Y |K) + δ1 + 2γ. (A.7)
Then, clearly,
2−n[λRU (D
′)−γ] > 2−n[H(Y |K)−I(X;Y,V |K)−δ1] ≥ q (A.8)
and so, Pr{
∑MU
i=1 Ai ≥ 2
nγ} is further upper bounded by
Pr
{
MU∑
i=1
Ai ≥ 2
nγ
}
≤ exp2
{
−MUD
(
2−n[λRU (D
′)−γ]‖2−n[H(Y |K)−I(X;Y,V |K)−δ1]
)}
. (A.9)
To further bound this expression from above, we have to get a lower bound to an expression
of the form D(e−na‖e−nb) for 0 < a < b. Applying the inequality log(1 + x) = − log(1 −
x
1+x) ≥
x log e
1+x , for x > −1, we have:
D(2−na‖2−nb) = 2−na log
2−na
2−nb
+ (1− 2−na) log
1− 2−na
1− 2−nb
= n(b− a)2−na + (1− 2−na) log
(
1 +
2−nb − 2−na
1− 2−nb
)
≥ n(b− a)2−na + (2−nb − 2−na) log e
≥ [n(b− a)− log e]2−na. (A.10)
Applying this inequality with a = λRU (D
′)− γ and b = H(Y |K) − I(X;Y, V |K) − δ1, we
get
D
(
2−n[λRU (D
′)−γ]‖2−n[H(Y |K)−I(X;Y,V |K)−δ1]
)
≥ (nγ − log e)2−n[λRU (D
′)−γ] (A.11)
and so,
Pr
{
MU∑
i=1
Ai ≥ 2
nγ
}
≤ 2−(nγ−log e)2
nγ
, (A.12)
which decays double–exponentially rapidly with n. While, this inequality holds for a given
yn, the probability that
∑MU
i=1 Ai ≥ 2
nγ for some yn ∈ Yn would be upper bounded, using
the union bound, by |Y|n · 2−(nγ−log e)2
nγ
, which still decays double–exponentially. Thus,
with very high probability the random selection of stegovectors, for kˆn, is such that no stego
codevector yn appears in more than 2nγ bins.
34
References
[1] A. Adelsbach, S. Katzenbeisser, and A.-R. Sadeghi, “Cryptography meets water-
marking: detecting watermarks with minimal or zero knowledge disclosure,” preprint
2002. Available on–line at [www-krypt.cs.uni-sb.de/download/papers]
[2] S. C. Cheung and D. K. W. Chiu, “A watermark infrastructure for enterprise docu-
ment management,” Proc. 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
(HICSS‘03), Hawaii, 2003.
[3] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, Wiley, New York,
1991.
[4] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, Information Theory: Coding Theorems for Discrete Memo-
ryless Systems, Academic Press, 1981.
[5] S. I. Gel’fand and M. S. Pinsker, “Coding for channel with random parameters,”
Problems of Information and Control, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 19-31, 1980.
[6] A. Jayawardena, B. Murison, and P. Lenders, “Embedding multiresolution binary
images into multiresolution watermark channels in wavelet domain,” preprint 2000.
Available on–line at [www.tsi.enst.fr/∼maitre/tatouage/icassp00/articles].
[7] K. Kuroda, M. Nishigaki, M. Soga, A. Takubo, and I. Naka-
mura, “A digital watermark using public–key cryptography for
open algorithm,” Proc. ICITA 2002. Also, available on–line at
[http://charybdis.mit.csu.edu.au/∼mantolov/CD/ICITA2002/papers/131-21.pdf].
[8] A. Maor and N. Merhav, “On joint information embedding and lossy compres-
sion,” submitted to IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, July 2003. Available on–line at
[www.ee.technion.ac.il/people/merhav].
[9] A. Maor and N. Merhav, “On joint information embedding and lossy com-
pression in the presence of a stationary memoryless attack channel,” sub-
mitted to IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, January 2004. Available on–line at
[www.ee.technion.ac.il/people/merhav].
35
[10] N. Merhav and S. Shamai (Shitz), “On joint source–channel coding for the Wyner–Ziv
source and the Gel’fand–Pinsker channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 49, no.
11, pp. 2844–2855, November 2003.
[11] P. Moulin and J. A. O’Sullivan, “Information–theoretic analysis of information hid-
ing,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 563–593, March 2003.
[12] P. Moulin and Y. Wang, “New results on steganographic capacity,” Proc. CISS 2004,
pp. 813–818, Princeton University, March 2004.
[13] D. Slepian and J. K. Wolf, “Noiseless coding of correlated information sources,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. IT–19, pp. 471–480, 1973.
[14] M. Steinder, S. Iren, and P. D. Amer, “Progressively authen-
ticated image transmission,” preprint 1999. Available on–line at
[www.cis.udel.edu /amer/PEL/poc/pdf/milcom99-steiner.pdf].
[15] H. Yamamoto, “Rate–distortion theory for the Shannon cipher system,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 827–835, May 1997.
36
Encoder DecoderAttack Channel
U
N
X
n
Y
n
K
n
Z
n Uˆ
N
Figure 1: A generic watermarking/encryption system.
Compressor
S−W
Attack
Channel
Decoder
Embedding
Lossy
Decoder
Source
Embedding
EncoderEncoder
Source
Lossy
Compressor
S−W
Decoder
Encoder
U
N W
L
W˜
L
Z
n
W˜L
SJ
⊕
UˆN
WL
Y n
Kn
X
n
SJ
⊕
Figure 2: The proposed watermarking/encryption scheme (general case).
37
